Replying to a question on China’s renaming of Indian territories, the spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs said on April 12 that “India categorically rejects any mischievous attempts by the Chinese side to assign fictitious names to places which form part of the territory of India.
“Such attempts by China at introducing false claims and manufacturing baseless narratives cannot alter the undeniable reality that these places and territories, including Arunachal Pradesh, were, are, and will always remain an integral and inalienable part of India.
“These actions by the Chinese side detract from ongoing efforts to stabilise and normalise India-China bilateral ties. China should refrain from actions which inject negativity into relations and undermine efforts to create a better understanding”.
Since 2017, China has been practising the release of lists of "standardised" Chinese names for locations in Arunachal Pradesh, referring to the state as "Zangnan" (South Tibet). This is to strengthen its territorial claims, often coinciding with geopolitical tensions. This is, in fact, part of a "[salami slicing]" strategy, aimed at asserting sovereignty through incremental, non-military provocations.
As it is, in my several writings in several places over several years, I have argued that China will always remain India’s principal rival. Geopolitical circumstances require us to live side-by-side, yet we should always expect only a restless peace where underlying tensions never quite settle.
How should India deal with a hostile China? Of the various answers that I have given to this question in my writings over the years, I treasure two of them in particular.
One is my argument, which was first published in the Tribune newspaper, that “Gandhisim” could be a diplomatic tool. I will repeat the same even today. The main component of rising Chinese power is its economic strength, particularly its foreign exchange reserve, that is, dollars. And this the Chinese have earned through the export of their goods, which they produce cheaply by their cheap labour, in markets all over the world. So let us adopt the Gandhian tool of the boycott of Chinese goods in India. Let us pledge ourselves not to buy Chinese goods. It will have a salutary impact on the Chinese rulers.
My second suggestion, which I treasure equally, is renaming Shantipath (crossing through the diplomatic enclave of Chanakyapuri, with foreign embassies, including that of China, located on both sides of the road) as the Dalai Lama Road.
I had written this first in a digital publication, First Post, as a reaction to China starting this unwarranted practice of renaming the Indian locations.
To be fair, the idea came to my mind over conversations with a neighbour, who, unfortunately, has departed for the other world in the meantime. That way, my neighbour, late Rajiv Chandra, should also be co-credited with this idea (I had done so in my piece for the First Post).
What is this idea? It is like this: “If China goes around renaming parts of Arunachal, we should rename Shantipath as Dalai Lama Road so that China is forced to write its address like this: Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, Dalai Lama Road, New Delhi”.
I think this is worth pursuing because it has a great symbolic value and conveys a strong message to China, which cannot tolerate any mention of the name of His Holiness. In fact, China complains the most whenever the Dalai Lama travels to Arunachal Pradesh.
One remembers here French philosopher Jacques Derrida, who had suggested in 1974 that “naming is a taxonomic strategy, which is also a manifestation of power.” It is true that naming or renaming of places, roads and buildings all over the world is a continuous trend; and invariably it is done by those who are in political power or who have the courage to manifest that power without bothering about the possible adverse reactions.
China has played this naming and renaming game many a time by changing Peking to Beijing, Canton to Guangzhou, Nanking to Nanjing, Sian to Xi’an and Tientsin to Tianjin. The list is illustrative, not exhaustive.
But in this case of Arunachal Pradesh, things are a little different. It is changing the names of the places that are not under its administrative control. Hence, this renaming does not change anything on the ground. What it actually has meant is that China will continue to embarrass India on many fronts; it will also toughen its position on the vexed boundary issue with India.
Just look at the major irritants on the Sino-Indian front. We have an unresolved border. Despite many rounds of negotiations, a border settlement acceptable to both the countries eludes. And here China’s posture is becoming tougher. The agreed principle - which, incidentally, emerged from Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in 2005 – that the settled population in the disputed border areas will not be disturbed in any eventual solution has been negated by China, which is now claiming Tawang, the holy city of the Buddhists in Arunachal Pradesh, as its own.
Incidentally, China claims Arunachal or for that matter our territories in the north as its own only after annexing Tibet, with which India had civilisational ties of thousands and thousands of years. That forced the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s lawful ruler, to come over to India. His government-in-exile operated from Himachal Pradesh (Dharmsala).
As it is, in 2003, the then Prime Minister A B Vajpayee had surrendered the little leverage that India had over Tibet. India had recognised Tibet to be a part of China through the India- China Treaty on Tibet, 1954. Its validity, however, was for eight years. That means that after 1962, India was not bound to regard Tibet as a part of China. The 1988 statement during Rajiv Gandhi’s visit was diplomatically worded in the sense that it talked of Tibet as an autonomous region of China, meaning that India’s view on Tibet could change if Beijing takes away Tibet’s autonomy. But Vajpayee, during his visit to China, agreed unconditionally that “Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).” And what is more important, such an agreement on Tibet was signed for the first time at the prime ministerial level.
But that did not satisfy China. In fact, its posture is becoming tougher, as its renaming practice suggests. So let us just reciprocate by renaming Shantipath as Dalai Lama Road.
Comments (1)
R
Renaming Shanti Path as Dalai Lama Marg will necessitate China to alter address of its embassy accordingly